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a b s t r a c t
Constructions of cryptographic primitives based on general assumptions (e.g., one-
way functions) tend to be less efficient than constructions based on specific (e.g.,
number-theoretic) assumptions. This has prompted a recent line of research aimed at
investigating the best possible efficiency of (black-box) cryptographic constructions based
on general assumptions. Here, we present bounds on the efficiency of statistically-binding
commitment schemes constructed using black-box access to one-way permutations; our
bounds are tight for the case of perfectly-binding schemes. Our bounds hold in an extension
of the Impagliazzo–Rudich model: we show that any construction beating our bounds
would imply the unconditional existence of a one-way function (fromwhich a statistically-
binding commitment scheme could be constructed ‘‘from scratch’’).
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A central focus of modern cryptography has been to identify the minimal assumptions needed for the construction
of various cryptographic tools and protocols. We know, for example, that one-way functions are necessary [15,21]
and sufficient for the construction of pseudorandom generators (PRGs) [2,25,12,14], universal one-way hash functions
(UOWHFs) and digital signature schemes [19,21], private-key encryption schemes [10], and commitment schemes [18].
Unfortunately, all the constructions just referenced are notoriously inefficient, and no constructions (based on one-way
functions) improving upon the efficiency of these solutions are known. On the other hand, more efficient constructions are
known to exist under stronger (e.g., number-theoretic) assumptions.
The apparent tradeoff between the efficiency of a construction and the underlying hardness assumption used to prove
it secure has prompted a recent line of research aimed at answering the following question: how efficient can constructions
based onminimal assumptions be? Oneway to formalize this question is to look at so-called ‘‘black-box’’ constructions which
use an underlying primitive (e.g., a one-way permutation) only as an oracle, but do not require an explicit circuit computing
the primitive in question (see Section 1.1 for further discussion). The idea of studying cryptographic constructions in this
way was initiated by Impagliazzo and Rudich [16,22] for proving impossibility of certain constructions, and much additional
work in this vein followed [23,24,7,8,5]. (See [20] for rigorous formal definitions of the Impagliazzo–Rudich model, as well
as some variants that have been used.) Kim, Simon, and Tetali [17] were the first to use thismodel as ameans of studying the
efficiency of constructions (rather than their feasibility), with efficiencymeasured in terms of the number of oracle callsmade
by the construction. They showed non-tight bounds on the efficiency of constructing UOWHFs from one-way permutations.
Extending their results, Gennaro, et al. [6] show that known constructions of UOWHFs based on one-way permutations are
in fact optimal; they also show efficiency bounds for the case of PRGs, private-key encryption schemes, and digital signatures
based on one-way permutations, as well as for the case of public-key encryption schemes based on trapdoor permutations.
In this work, we bound the efficiency of constructions of statistically-binding commitment schemes based on one-way
permutations. Our results are tight (i.e., they match known constructions) for the case of perfectly-binding commitment
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schemes. We remark that such bounds do not follow from the work of Gennaro, et al. [6], and in fact proving bounds
for the case of commitment schemes was left as an explicit open question there. Indeed, beyond the additional technical
ideas used in this work, our bound is interesting as the first example of an efficiency bound on a protocol which protects
against malicious participants (the cryptographic primitives considered in [17,6] only involve honest participants, with the
adversary being a ‘‘passive observer’’).
Before describing our results inmore detail, we provide a brief overview of the Impagliazzo–Rudichmodel and black-box
lower bounds. (The following is adapted from [6], including only what is directly relevant to the present work. For a more
general discussion, see [6,20].)
1.1. Black-box lower bounds
At the most general level, a construction of a commitment scheme based on one-way permutations may be viewed as
a procedure P which takes as input (a description of) a permutation pi and outputs (a description of) two circuits (S,R)
(here, S represents the sender whileR represents the receiver; see Sections 1.2 and 2.2) realizing the desired commitment
functionality whenever pi is a permutation. If the construction is black-box, this means that P relies only on the input/output
behavior of pi and not on any internal structure of the implementation of pi ; formally, this means that the construction can
be described as a pair of oracle procedures (S(·),R(·)) such that (Spi ,Rpi ) realizes the desired functionality of a commitment
scheme for any permutation pi .
Besides achieving some desired functionality, a construction of a commitment scheme should also be ‘‘secure’’ in some
sense. There are various ways this can be formalized (see [20]); we will be interested here in weak black-box constructions
which offer the following guarantee:
If pi is a one-way permutation, then the scheme (Spi ,Rpi ) is ‘‘secure’’ against all efficient adversaries (who are not
given oracle access to pi ),
where ‘‘secure’’ in the above refers to some notions of hiding and binding that will be formalized later. The distinction
betweenwhether an adversary is given oracle access to pi or not is important since the above should hold even when pi is not
efficiently computable (and so the only way for an efficient adversary to evaluatepi , in general, may be via oracle access topi ).
Note, however, that a weak black-box construction suffices to give implementations withmeaningful security guarantees in
the real world: in this case, pi will be efficiently computable and furthermore an explicit circuit for pi will be known; hence,
it is irrelevant whether an adversary is given oracle access to pi or not. Note also that weak black-box constructions are the
weakest type of black-box construction considered in [20], and hence impossibility results for weak black-box constructions
rule out other black-box constructions as well.
Although most currently-known constructions are black-box, it is important to recognize that a number of non-black-
box constructions do exist. As an example, all known constructions of public-key encryption schemes secure against
chosen-ciphertext attacks based on trapdoor permutations (e.g., [4]) are non-black-box. (See [6] for additional examples.)
Nevertheless, a black-box impossibility result is useful in that it indicates the techniques necessary to achieve a particular
result. Furthermore, known non-black-box constructions are much less efficient than black-box ones, and so a black-box
impossibility result can be said to rule out ‘‘practical’’ constructions.
1.2. Our results
With the above in mind, we may now describe our results a bit more formally. An interactive commitment scheme for
m-bit messages is a pair of procedures (S,R) which operates in two phases. In the commitment phase, the sender S takes
as input a message M ∈ {0, 1}m and interacts with the receiver R; we will refer to the view ofR at the conclusion of this
phase as the commitment toM . In the decommitment phase, the sender forwards a decommitment toR which, in particular,
revealsM . Without loss of generality, we will assume that the decommitment simply consists ofM along with the random
coins used by S during the commitment phase.
A commitment scheme should guarantee both hiding and binding, where informally these mean that (1) the receiver
should have no information aboutM before the decommitment phase while (2) the sender should be committed to a unique
message at the end of the commitment phase. More formally, a commitment scheme is statistically binding if it satisfies the
following:
Hiding: For any M,M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m, the distribution over commitments (by the honest sender S) to M is computationally
indistinguishable from the distribution over commitments (by S) to M ′, even when S interacts with a malicious
(but computationally bounded) receiverR∗.
(Statistical) binding: The probability (over coin tosses r of the honest receiverR) that there exist distinct M,M ′ and coins
s, s′ for S such that the corresponding commitments toM,M ′ are identical is at most εb. When εb = 0 we say the
scheme is perfectly binding.
Note that the formulation of the binding requirement ensures security even against an all-powerful sender. Our definition
of the binding requirement is somewhat stronger than the usual one which, roughly speaking, requires only that a
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computationally-unbounded sender without knowledge of r be unable to find distinct M,M ′ and coins s, s′ such that the
corresponding commitments are identical (except with some probability εb). For two-round public-coin schemes (where
the receiver simply sends a random string and the sender responds with a commitment) and perfectly-binding schemes,
however, the notions are identical. Looking ahead, we remark that all the constructions we show in Section 4 satisfy the
strong definition of binding given above.
Say a permutation pi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is one-way with security S if any circuit of size at most S inverts pi on at most
a fraction 1/S of its inputs. Our main result may be stated as follows: any weak black-box construction of a statistically-
binding commitment scheme based on a one-way permutation with security S requires Ω ((m− log(1+ 2m · εb))/ log S)
invocations of the permutation (by the sender and receiver combined for statistically-binding schemes, and by the sender
alone for perfectly-binding schemes). Formally, we show that any construction beating this bound would imply the
unconditional existence of a statistically-binding commitment scheme; or, put another way, the only way to develop amore
efficient construction of a commitment scheme based on one-way permutations is to construct a commitment scheme from
scratch. The existence of a commitment scheme implies the existence of one-way functions, and hence P 6= NP , and so
any black-box construction beating our bound would also imply a proof that P 6= NP .
For perfectly-binding schemes, our bound shows thatΩ(m/ log S) invocations of the one-way permutation are needed;
our bound in this case matches the efficiency achieved by the construction of Blum [1], instantiated using the Goldreich–
Levin hard-core bits of a one-way permutation [12]. This is discussed further in Section 4,wherewe also compare our bounds
to known constructions of statistically-binding schemes.
A natural adaptation of our bounds applies also to constructions of commitment schemes based on oracle access to
trapdoor one-way permutations (see [6] for definitions).
2. Definitions
2.1. Preliminaries
Let Af denote a circuit A with oracle access to the function f . A function f : [2] {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is (S, ε)-one-way if for
every circuit A of size at most S we have
Prx[Af (f (x)) ∈ f −1(f (x))] ≤ ε.
To reduce the number of parameters, we will call a function S-hard if it is (S, 1/S)-one way.
LetΠt denote the set of all permutations over {0, 1}t . We rely on the following result:
Theorem 1 ([6]). For sufficiently large t, a random pi ∈ Πt is 2t/5-hard with probability at least 1− 2−2t/2 .
Let a‖b denote the concatenation of strings a and b. For t < n, let Πt,n denote the subset of Πn such that pi ∈ Πt,n iff
pi(a‖b) = pˆi(a)‖b for some pˆi ∈ Πt (i.e., the last n − t bits of the input are fixed). A corollary of Theorem 1 is that if
t = 5 log S, then for any n > t a randomly chosen pi ∈ Πt,n is S-hard with high probability; more formally:
Corollary 2 ([6]). For sufficiently large t and n > t, a random pi ∈ Πt,n is 2t/5-hard with probability at least 1− 2−2t/2 .
We say that two distributionsX,Y are (S, ε)-indistinguishable, and writeX
(S,ε)≈ Y, if for every circuit Dist of size at most
S, we have∣∣∣∣ Prx∈X[Dist(x) = 1] − Prx∈Y[Dist(x) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
2.2. Commitment schemes
A commitment scheme form-bit messages is defined by a pair of probabilistic, interactive algorithms (S,R) representing
a sender and a receiver, respectively. (We remark that (S,R) describe the commitment phase only; recall that, without loss
of generality, we will assume that the sender simply reveals M and its random tape s in order to decommit.) The inputs to
S are a messageM ∈ {0, 1}m and a random tape s, while the input toR is a random tape r . Let 〈S(M; s),R∗(r)〉 denote the
viewof a (possiblymalicious) receiverR∗ following an interactionwith the sender on the specified inputs; this view consists
of the receiver’s randomness and themessages it receives from the sender during the interaction. (When the receivermakes
queries to an oracle, the view also includes the answers it receives from this oracle.) For amessageM and receiverR∗, define
〈S(M),R∗〉 def= {s, r ← {0, 1}∗ : 〈S(M; s),R∗(r)〉} ;
i.e., this denotes the distribution over the view ofR∗ following an interaction with the honest sender who is committing to
messageM .
We now define the security of a commitment scheme. In this paper we only deal with statistically-binding schemes, as
reflected in the definitions that follow.
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Definition 3. Let (S,R) be a commitment scheme for m-bit messages. We say that (S,R) is (Sh, εh)-hiding if for every
circuitR∗ of size at most Sh and for allM0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}m, we have
〈S(M0),R∗〉
(Sh,εh)≈ 〈S(M1),R∗〉. (1)
(To be meaningful, Sh should be at least the size of the honest receiver algorithmR.) We say that (S,R) is εb-binding if
Pr
r
[∃ distinctM,M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m, s, s′ such that
〈S(M ′; s′),R(r)〉 = 〈S(M; s),R(r)〉
]
≤ εb.
Note that if a commitment scheme is b-binding then even an all-powerful sender cannot commit in such a way that it can
later decommit to two differentmessages, exceptwith probability (atmost) b. We say that (S,R) is εb-binding for an honest
sender if for allM ∈ {0, 1}m, we have
Pr
s,r
[ ∃M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m \M, s′ such that
〈S(M ′; s′),R(r)〉 = 〈S(M; s),R(r)〉
]
≤ εb.
Roughly speaking, such a scheme satisfies the following property: if the sender is honest during the commitment phase
(and uses a pre-fixed message M and truly random coins s) then the sender cannot later decommit to a different value M ′
except with probability (at most) b. If εb = 0 in either of the above definitions, we say the scheme is perfectly binding (resp.,
perfectly binding for an honest sender).
(S,R) is (Sh, εh, εb)-secure (resp., secure for an honest sender) if (S,R) is (Sh, εh)-hiding and εb-binding (resp., binding
for an honest sender).
We may now define a weak black-box construction of a commitment scheme based on one-way permutations.
Definition 4. A construction of a commitment scheme form-bitmessages based on one-way permutations is a pair of oracle
algorithms (S(·),R(·)) such that, for all pi ∈ Πn, the resulting (Spi ,Rpi ) is a commitment scheme for m-bit messages. We
say that (S(·),R(·)) is (Sp, Sh, εh, εb)-secure (resp., secure for an honest sender) if (Spi ,Rpi ) is εb-binding (resp., binding for an
honest sender) for every pi ∈ Πn, and furthermore for every pi ∈ Πn that is Sp-hard, scheme (Spi ,Rpi ) is (Sh, εh)-hiding.1
2.3. Pairwise-independent function families
Let H be a family of functions mappingm-bit strings tom′-bit strings. We assume that the following can be done in time
polynomial inm: (1) selecting a function h ∈ H uniformly at random; and (2) given h ∈ H and x ∈ {0, 1}m, evaluating h(x).
We say H is a pairwise-independent hash family [3] if for any distinct x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}m and any y1, y2 ∈ {0, 1}m′ we have:
Pr
h∈H[h(x1) = y1 ∧ h(x2) = y2] = 2
−2m′ .
Constructions satisfying the above requirements are well known.
3. Lower bounding the efficiency of commitment
Let (S(·),R(·)) be an (Sp, Sh, εh, εb)-secure construction of a commitment scheme form-bit messages (based on one-way
permutations). For εb > 0, we prove that unless S and R (combined) make Ω
(
(m− log(1+ 2m · εb))/ log Sp
)
queries to
their oracle, there exists (constructively) a commitment scheme (S¯, R¯) secure for an honest sender that does not require
any oracle access at all (i.e., the scheme is secure unconditionally). For εb = 0, we show a similar result but where the
implication holds unless S alonemakesΩ
(
m/ log Sp
)
queries to its oracle. In either case, by applying a result of Impagliazzo
and Luby [15] (cf. also Lemma 5 below) this implies the unconditional existence of a one-way function, which in turn can
be used to give an unconditional construction of a commitment scheme [18].
We describe here some of the intuition behind our proof, focusing for ease of exposition on the case that (S(·),R(·)) is
perfectly binding. As in [6], our starting point is that a random pi ∈ Πt,n (for t = Θ(log Sp)) is Sp-hard with all but negligible
probability (cf. Corollary 2). Consider the non-interactive scheme (S′,R′) in which S′ locally runs (S(·),R(·)), simulating a
random pi ∈ Πt,n for the algorithms at hand,2 and then sends the resulting view of R to R′. Decommitment, as usual, is
performed by having S′ send the message and all the random coins it used toR′.
It is quite straightforward to show that (S′,R′) still satisfies hiding. Binding, however, may not necessarily hold even
when S′ is honest during the commitment phase. To see the issue, assume S′ commits to a messageM using coins s for S(·),
coins r for R(·), and coins y to simulate the permutation. Let C denote the resulting view of R, and let P denote the set of
t-bit query/answer prefixes made by S during the computation. To claim binding, we would need to argue that there does
1 Our constructions are weak black-box in the sense that the distinguisher (implicit in (1)) is not given oracle access to pi .
2 This can be done easily by selecting random t-bit answer prefixes for any new t-bit query prefixes, as needed; see details in the proof of Theorem 6.
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not exist a message M ′ 6= M along with coins s′, y′, with an associated set of query/answer prefixes P ′, that produce an
identical view C (note that the coins r are fixed, since r is explicit in the view C that was already sent toR′). The most we
can claim, though, is that this is true as long as P ′ = P , since binding is only guaranteed to hold when the permutation pi is
fixed, but not when the sender can ‘‘change’’ the permutation after the fact.
Whatwe can show is that aweaker form of (honest sender) binding holds for (S′,R′). Observe that for any possible P ′ (as
defined above), there is at most one message M ′ to which the sender can successfully decommit by sending M ′, s′, y′ with
associated query/answer set P ′; this is because (S(·),R(·)) is perfectly binding for any fixed permutation. But this implies
that there are at most 22t|P ′| = 22tq different messages to which the sender can successfully decommit, where q is the total
number of queries made by S (note that the oracle queries/answers of R are already fixed by the view C). Although this
clearly violates binding, it does somewhat limit the space of possible messages to which the sender can decommit as long
as 22tq < 2m.
We next show how to ‘‘bootstrap’’ from the weak form of binding achieved by (S′,R′) to construct a non-interactive
scheme (S¯, R¯) that achieves ‘‘full’’ binding (for an honest sender) with noticeable probability. Sender S¯, on input a message
M , proceeds as follows: it first chooses a function h uniformly at random from a pairwise-independent hash family mapping
m-bit strings to m-bit strings. It then computes the views C1 = S′(M), C2 = S′(h(M)), and sends C1‖C2‖h to R¯. Hiding for
this scheme follows easily via a standard hybrid argument and relying on the fact that (S′,R′) is hiding. As for binding (for
an honest sender), we have already seen that C1 can be decommitted to a set S1 of at most 22tq < 2m different messages,
and similarly C2 can be decommitted to a set S2 of at most 22tq different messages. For binding not to hold, there must exist
an M ′ 6= M with M ′ ∈ S1 and h(M ′) ∈ S2. Using the pairwise independence of h, we can argue that this occurs with only
‘‘small’’ probability over choice of h. Thus, binding for (S¯, R¯) (for an honest sender) holds with noticeable probability.
3.1. A technical lemma
We begin by showing that the existence of a commitment scheme secure for honest senders implies the existence of a
one-way function. Although the result can be derived from [15], we give a simple and more direct proof here.
Lemma 5. Let (S,R) be a commitment scheme for m-bit messages which is (Sh, εh, εb)-secure for an honest sender. Let SS, SR be
the sizes of the circuits computing S,R, respectively. Then there exists an (Sh − SS + SR − O(m), εh + 2εb)-one-way function.
Proof. Let S∗ = Sh − SS + SR − O(m) and ∗ = εh + 2εb. Define a function f via f (M, s, r) def= 〈S(M; s),R(r)〉. We claim
that f is (S∗, ∗)-one-way. Assume the contrary. Then there exists a circuit B of size at most S∗ such that
SuccowfB,f
def= Pr
M,s,r
[B(f (M, s, r)) ∈ f −1(f (M, s, r))] > ε∗.
We use B to construct a circuit A that violates the hiding property of (S,R). On input (M0,M1, C), where C is either a
commitment to M0 or M1, A computes (M ′, s′, r ′) ← B(C) and checks whether f (M ′, s′, r ′) ?= C and whether M ′ ?= M0. If
both hold, A outputs 0; otherwise, it outputs 1. Note that |A| = |B| + SS + SR + O(m) ≤ Sh.
Let Bad def= {(M, s, r) | ∃M ′ 6= M, s′ : 〈S(M; s),R(r)〉 = 〈S(M ′; s′),R(r)〉}. In what follows, note that if (M ′, s′, r ′) ∈
f −1(f (M, s, r)) then r ′ = r , as r is included in the receiver’s view. We have:
Pr
M0,M1
C∈〈S (M0),R〉
[A(M0,M1, C) = 0] = Pr
M0,s,r
[
(M ′, s′, r ′)← B(f (M0, s, r)) :
(M ′, s′, r ′) ∈ f −1(f (M0, s, r)) ∧ M ′ = M0
]
≥ Pr
M0,s,r
[
(M ′, s′, r ′)← B(f (M0, s, r)) :
(M ′, s′, r ′) ∈ f −1(f (M0, s, r)) ∧ (M0, s, r) 6∈ Bad
]
≥ Pr
M0,s,r
[
(M ′, s′, r ′)← B(f (M0, s, r)) :
(M ′, s′, r ′) ∈ f −1(f (M0, s, r))
]
− Pr
M0,s,r
[(M0, s, r) ∈ Bad]
≥ SuccowfB,f − εb
= εh + εb.
Furthermore, we have:
Pr
M0,M1
C∈〈S (M1),R〉
[A(M0,M1, C) = 0] = Pr
M0,M1
s,r
[
(M ′, s′, r ′)← B(f (M1, s, r)) :
(M ′, s′, r ′) ∈ f −1(f (M1, s, r))∧M ′ = M0
]
≤ Pr
M0,M1
s,r
[
(M ′, s′, r ′)← B(f (M1, s, r)) :
(M ′, s′, r ′) ∈ f −1(f (M1, s, r))∧(M1, s, r) ∈ Bad
]
≤ Pr
M1,s,r
[(M1, s, r) ∈ Bad]
≤ εb.
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Putting everything together, we have:∣∣∣∣ PrM0,M1
C∈〈S (M0),R〉
[A(M0,M1, C) = 0] − Pr
M0,M1
C∈〈S (M1),R〉
[A(M0,M1, C) = 0]
∣∣∣∣ > εh.
But this implies that there exist two messages M0,M1 for which A can distinguish 〈S(M0),R〉 from 〈S(M1),R〉 with
probability greater than εh, contradicting the hiding of (S,R). 
3.2. Main result
We now formalize the intuition that was discussed earlier. The proof below is not as straightforward as the intuition
would suggest, since some technical work is required to deal with the case of statistical (as opposed to perfect) binding.
Theorem 6. Let (S(·),R(·)) be an (Sp, Sh, εh, εb)-secure construction of a commitment scheme for m-bit messages that expects
an oracle pi ∈ Πn. Let t = 5 log Sp. Assume εh ≤ 1/8−21−Sp . If εb > 0 and S andRmake a total of q ≤ (m−2− log(1+2m+1 ·
εb))/4t queries to their oracle, or if εb = 0 and S makes qS ≤ (m− 2)/4t queries to its oracle, then there exists a commitment
scheme (without access to any oracle) for m-bit messages which is (Sh, 1/4, 1/4)-secure for an honest sender.
Applying Lemma 5, the conclusion of the theorem implies the existence of a one-way function (without access to any oracle).
Proof. We construct a commitment scheme (S¯, R¯) for m-bit messages, following the intuition outlined earlier. The
construction makes use of a procedure SIM that simulates a random permutation inΠt,n as follows: SIMmaintains a list
Lwhich is initially empty. To respond to a query a‖a′, where |a| = t and ∣∣a′∣∣ = n− t , procedure SIM first checks whether
there exists a value b such that (a, b) ∈ L. If so, SIM returns b‖a′. Otherwise, it picks b ∈ {0, 1}t \
{
bˆ | ∃aˆ : (aˆ, bˆ) ∈ L
}
uniformly at random, adds (a, b) to L, and returns b‖a′. We let SIMy denote an execution of SIM using random coins y.
Let H be a pairwise-independent family of functions from m-bit strings to m-bit strings. Define S¯ as follows. On
input a message M ∈ {0, 1}m, S¯ chooses uniformly at random h ∈ H and values s1, r1, y1, s2, r2, y2. It then computes3
C1 = 〈SSIMy1 (M; s1),RSIMy1 (r1)〉 and C2 = 〈SSIMy2 (h(M); s2),RSIMy2 (r2)〉, and outputs C1‖C2‖h. Decommitment, as
usual, is done by having S¯ revealM and all the random coins used during the commitment phase. The claim that (S¯, R¯) is
(Sh, 1/4, 1/4)-secure for an honest sender follows from the next two lemmas.
Lemma 7. (S¯, R¯) is (Sh, 1/4)-hiding.
Proof. The proof is quite straightforward. The hiding property of (S(·),R(·)) guarantees that for any pi ∈ Πn that is Sp-hard,
for any circuit Dist of size at most Sh, and for any messagesM0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}m, we have∣∣∣∣ PrC∈〈Spi (M0),Rpi 〉[Dist(C) = 0] − PrC∈〈Spi (M1),Rpi 〉[Dist(C) = 0]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ εh.
To save on notation, let Compi (M) denote 〈Spi (M0),Rpi 〉; i.e., Compi (M) denotes the distribution on views of the honest
receiver when S commits to M and the parties are using oracle pi . A straightforward hybrid argument shows that for any
pi1, pi2 ∈ Πn that are Sp-hard, for any circuit Dist of size at most Sh, and for anyM0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}m, we have
2εh ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ Prh∈HC1∈Compi1 (M0)
C2∈Compi2 (h(M0))
[Dist(C1‖C2‖h) = 0] − Pr
h∈H
C1∈Compi1 (M1)
C2∈Compi2 (h(M1))
[Dist(C1‖C2‖h) = 0]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Corollary 2 shows that a random permutation pi ∈ Πt,n is Sp-hard except with probability at most 2−S5/2p ≤ 2−Sp . Using a
union bound and a simple averaging argument,we see that for any circuitDist of size atmost Sh and for anyM0,M1 ∈ {0, 1}m,
2εh + 21−Sp ≥
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr
pi1,pi2∈Πt,n
h∈H
C1∈Compi1 (M0)
C2∈Compi2 (h(M0))
[Dist(C1‖C2‖h) = 0] − Pr
pi1,pi2∈Πt,n
h∈H
C1∈Compi1 (M1)
C2∈Compi2 (h(M1))
[Dist(C1‖C2‖h) = 0]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
3 The permutations simulated by SIM in the computations of C1, C2 will, in general, be different. The theorem can be strengthened (improving the
bound on εh) by having SIM provide a consistent simulation for both computations. We forgo this for simplicity.
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Since SIM perfectly simulates a random pi ∈ Πt,n, this is exactly equivalent to∣∣∣∣ PrC∈〈S¯ (M0),R∗ 〉[Dist(C) = 0] − PrC∈〈S¯ (M1),R∗ 〉[Dist(C) = 0]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2εh + 21−Sp ≤ 1/4
for anyR∗ and any circuit Dist of size at most Sh, where the last inequality uses the assumption that εh ≤ 1/8− 21−Sp . The
hiding property therefore holds as claimed. 
Lemma 8. (S¯, R¯) is 1/4-binding for an honest sender.
Proof. For ease of notation, let
Com(M, s, r, y) def= 〈SSIMy(M; s),RSIMy(r)〉.
Fix an arbitraryM ∈ {0, 1}m. We are interested in the following probability:
NoBind
def= Pr
s¯
[∃M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m \M, s¯′ such that
〈S¯(M ′; s¯′), R¯〉 = 〈S¯(M; s¯), R¯〉
]
= Pr
h∈H
s1,r1,y1
s2,r2,y2
[∃M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m \M, h′, s′1, r ′1, y′1, s′2, r ′2, y′2 such that
Com(M ′, s′1, r
′
1, y
′
1)‖Com(h′(M ′), s′2, r ′2, y′2)‖h′= Com(M, s1, r1, y1)‖Com(h(M), s2, r2, y2)‖h
]
= Pr
h∈H
s1,r1,y1
s2,r2,y2
[ ∃M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m \M, s′1, y′1, s′2, y′2 such that
Com(M ′, s′1, r1, y
′
1)= Com(M, s1, r1, y1)
∧
Com(h(M ′), s′2, r2, y
′
2)= Com(h(M), s2, r2, y2)
]
,
where in the last equality we use the fact that h′, r ′1, r
′
2 and h, r1, r2 are explicit in the view of R¯. Letting
Decom(M, s, r, y) def=
{
M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m
∣∣∣∣ ∃s′, y′ such thatCom(M ′, s′, r, y′) = Com(M, s, r, y)
}
,
we may write:
NoBind = Pr
h∈H
s1,r1,y1
s2,r2,y2
[ ∃M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m \M such that
M ′ ∈ Decom(M, s1, r1, y1) ∧
h(M ′) ∈ Decom(h(M), s2, r2, y2)
]
.
For any integer q, letPermqt denote the set of ‘‘partial permutations’’ of size q over t-bit strings; formally,Perm
q
t contains all
sets P ⊆ {0, 1}t×{0, 1}t such that P contains exactly q tuples and such that for all a there exists atmost one bwith (a, b) ∈ P
and for all b there exists atmost one a such that (a, b) ∈ P (i.e., P can be extended to a permutation over {0, 1}t ). Let qS (resp.,
qR) denote the number of queries made by S (resp.,R) to its oracle,4 and let q = qS + qR . Let queries(M, s, r, y) ∈ Permqt
denote the set of query/answer prefixes made by either S or R to SIM during the computation of Com(M, s, r, y) (i.e.,
(a, b) ∈ queries(M, s, r, y) iff an oracle query a‖a′, by either S orR, is answered by SIMwith b‖a′ during the computation
of Com(M, s, r, y)). Define queriesS(M, s, r, y) (resp., queriesR(M, s, r, y)) similarly, where this refers exclusively to queries
made by S (resp.,R).
Define r as good for P ∈ Permqt if there do not exist distinctM ′,M ′′, along with s′, s′′, y′, y′′, such that
• Com(M ′, s′, r, y′) = Com(M ′′, s′′, r, y′′); and
• queries(M ′, s′, r, y′) = queries(M ′′, s′′, r, y′′) = P .
Say r is good if it is good for all P ∈ Permqt .
We first observe that for a good r , the set Decom(M, s, r, y) contains at most
∣∣PermqSt ∣∣ < 22tqS messages. Otherwise,
by the pigeonhole principle, there exists a PS ∈ PermqSt and distinct messages M ′,M ′′ ∈ Decom(M, s, r, y), along
with s′, s′′, y′, y′′, such that Com(M ′, s′, r, y′) = Com(M, s, r, y) = Com(M ′′, s′′, r, y′′) and queriesS(M ′, s′, r, y′) =
queriesS(M ′′, s′′, r, y′′) = PS . (Notice also that queriesR(M ′, s′, r, y′) = queriesR(M, s, r, y) = queriesR(M ′′, s′′, r, y′′),
as these queries are explicit in the receiver’s views.) But then r is not good for P def= PS ∪ queriesR(M, s, r, y), contradicting
the assumption that r is good.
4 Without loss of generality, we assume exactly qS (resp., qR) queries are always made.
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Fix some P ∈ Permqt , and let piP denote an arbitrary extension of P to a permutation inΠt,n. We have
Pr
r
[r is not good for P] = Pr
r
[ ∃ distinctM ′,M ′′ and s′, s′′, y′, y′′ such that
Com(M ′, s′, r, y′) = Com(M ′′, s′′, r, y′′) ∧
queries(M ′, s′, r, y′) = queries(M ′′, s′′, r, y′′) = P
]
≤ Pr
r
[ ∃ distinctM ′,M ′′ and s′, s′′ such that
〈SpiP (M ′; s′),RpiP (r)〉 = 〈SpiP (M ′′; s′′),RpiP (r)〉
]
≤ εb,
by the binding property of (S(·),R(·)). Applying a union bound over all elements of Permqt , we obtain:
Pr
r
[r is not good] < 22tq · εb.
We proceed to bound NoBind. We have:
NoBind ≤ Pr
h∈H
s1,r1,y1
s2,r2,y2
[ ∃M ′ ∈ {0, 1}m \M such that
M ′ ∈ Decom(M, s1, r1, y1)
h(M ′) ∈ Decom(h(M), s2, r2, y2)
∣∣∣∣∣ r1, r2 good
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
LeftTerm
+22tq+1 · εb,
where the right term above represents an upper bound on the probability that either r1 or r2 is not good. Continuing with
the left term, we have
LeftTerm =
∑
M2∈{0,1}m
Pr
h∈H
s1,r1,y1
s2,r2,y2
[ ∃M ′ ∈ Decom(M, s1, r1, y1) \M
andM ′2 ∈ Decom(M2, s1, r1, y1)
such that h(M) = M2 ∧ h(M ′) = M ′2
∣∣∣∣∣ r1, r2 good
]
=
∑
M2∈{0,1}m
2−2m ·max
s1,y1
s2,y2
good r1,r2
{
|Decom(M, s1, r1, y1)| · |Decom(M2, s2, r2, y2)|
} ,
using pairwise independence of H . Applying the bound on the size of Decom(M, s, r, y)when r is good, we obtain
LeftTerm ≤ 2−2m · 2m · 24tqS = 24tqS−m.
Putting everything together, we have
NoBind ≤ 24tqS−m + 22tq+1 · εb.
If εb = 0 and qS ≤ (m− 2)/4t , it is easy to see that NoBind ≤ 1/4. When εb > 0 and q ≤ (m− 2− log(1+ 2m+1 · εb))/4t ,
then 24tqS−m + 22tq+1 · εb ≤ 24tq · (2−m + 2εb) and hence NoBind ≤ 1/4 in this case as well. The claim follows. 
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
4. Upper bounds on the efficiency of commitment
Here, we briefly describe upper bounds on the efficiency of black-box constructions of commitment schemes based on
one-way permutations.
4.1. Perfectly-binding commitment
A perfectly-binding commitment scheme can be constructed from one-way permutations using the approach of Blum [1]
along with the Goldreich–Levin hard-core function paradigm [12]. Specifically, let h : [2] {0, 1}n → {0, 1}` be a hard-core
function (see [9]) for a one-way permutation pi : [2] {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. To commit to a message M ∈ {0, 1}m, the sender
first divides M into t = dm/`e blocks N1, . . . ,Nt , each of length `. Then, for each block Ni the sender chooses a random
si ∈ {0, 1}n and sends pi(si), h(si) ⊕ Ni to the receiver. Since there exists a hard-core function with ` = O(log S) for any
S-hard pi (and large enough n) [12] (see also [9, Section 2.5.3]), this construction requires O(m/ log S) invocations of pi ,
matching our bound.
4.2. Statistically-binding commitment for single-bit messages
Naor [18] showed a construction of a statistically-binding commitment scheme for single-bit messages based on one-
way functions. Let G : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n+k be a pseudorandom generator. The receiver first chooses a random r ∈ {0, 1}n+k
and sends this value to the other party. The sender then commits to a bit b as follows: it chooses a random s ∈ {0, 1}n and
sends G(s) if b = 0 and G(s)⊕ r if b = 1. This scheme is binding with εb < 22n/2n+k = 2n−k.
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Although a pseudorandom generator G can be constructed from any one-way function [14], we examine the efficiency of
the above schemewhen G is based on an S-hard one-way permutation pi : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n so as to compare the efficiency
of the scheme to our bound. In this case, evaluating G requires O(k/ log S) invocations of pi [25,2,12]. Viewing n as fixed, this
is O(log ε−1b / log S) invocations of pi (for k polynomial in n).
4.3. Statistically-binding constructions for longer messages
There are a number of ways to extend the Naor scheme described above for the case of m-bit messages. One obvious
approach is to simply run the basic Naor scheme in parallel for each bit of the message, having the sender/receiver use the
same value r for all these commitments. This gives a scheme which is binding with εb < 2n−k as before, but where the
number of invocations of pi required is now O(mk/ log S).
A better approach, suggested in [18], is to have the sender use the above idea to commit to an n-bit seed s, and then
additionally send G′(s) ⊕ M (where M is the sender’s message and G′ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is another pseudorandom
generator). This is still binding with εb < 2n−k as before; the number of invocations of pi required, however, is O(nk/ log S+
(m− n)/ log S)which is more efficient than the previous approach whenm > n.
A third approach, suggested in [18] as well, utilizes asymptotically good error-correcting codes to extend the basic
scheme.Wepresent a simpler constructionherewhich achieves the sameefficiency andwhich (to the best of our knowledge)
has not appeared before. Let G : [2] {0, 1}n → {0, 1}` be a pseudorandom generator, where ` will be fixed later. The
receiver begins by choosing random r1, . . . , rm ∈ {0, 1}` and transmitting these to the sender. The sender chooses a random
s ∈ {0, 1}n and responds with
(⊕
i:Mi=1 ri
)
⊕G(s) (whereMi is the ith bit ofM). As in the basic Naor scheme, hiding follows
easily from the pseudorandomness of G. As for binding, we have
Pr
r1,...,rm
[ ∃M 6= M ′, s, s′ such that(⊕
i:Mi=1 ri
)
⊕ G(s) =
(⊕
i:M ′i=1 ri
)
⊕ G(s′)
]
= Pr
r1,...,rm
[ ∃M 6= M ′, s, s′ such that⊕
i:Mi⊕M ′i=1 ri = G(s)⊕ G(s′)
]
= Pr
r1,...,rm
[∃N 6= 0m, s, s′ such that⊕
i:Ni=1 ri = G(s)⊕ G(s′)
]
≤
∑
s,s′
N 6=0m
Pr
r1,...,rm
[⊕
i:Ni=1
ri = G(s)⊕ G(s′)
]
< 2m · 22n · 2−`.
Setting ` = n + m + k, we obtain a scheme that is binding except with probability εb < 2n−k (as previously) and which
requires only O((m+ k)/ log S) invocations of an S-hard permutation pi .
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